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With every choice there is a forgone choice,
or opportunity cost. When I choose to
dine at a particular restaurant, not only
am I giving up the opportunity to dine
elsewhere, but I am also giving up the
opportunity to learn the quality of other
restaurants. When the values of alterna-
tives are unknown, over time this dilemma
becomes a balance of exploration of lesser-
known options and exploitation of cur-
rently favored options.
Knox et al. (2012) investigate
exploratory and exploitative behavior
to understand whether people update
beliefs about the state of their environ-
ment in a reflexive way (only in response
to observed changes) or a reflective
way (without direct observation). This
approach for understanding how to learn
in complex environments is similar to the
dichotomy of model-based and model-
free in reinforcement learning (Barto
et al., 1990; Sutton and Barto, 1998),
which has recently re-emerged in psy-
chology and neuroscience to describe
the processes of learning (Daw et al.,
2006; Dayan and Daw, 2008; Chater,
2009; Glascher et al., 2010). In modern
reinforcement learning, there are typi-
cally three levels of learning strategies.
In the simplest type, model-free deci-
sion makers navigate their environments
through simple trial-and-error learning
about the value of possible actions based
only on direct experiences. In contrast,
model-based decision makers use inter-
nal representations of the environment
to make predictions through simulation
in addition to direct experience. And at
the third-level, exploration by model-
based decision makers can be directed
by planning to reduce uncertainty. These
strategies map very well to the three mod-
els (Naïve RL, Belief model, Ideal Actor
model) evaluated by Knox et al. (2012).
Although the authors draw upon ter-
minology from social psychology, the
findings from this research should broadly
inform all research related to learning
under uncertainty.
The primary finding from Knox et al.
(2012) is that human decision makers
learn from interaction with their envi-
ronment in a reflective manner but do
not plan optimally, which is conver-
gent with similar findings by Daw et al.
(2006). Decision makers are myopic, in
that exploratory choice does not con-
sider the long-term information value of
actions. By design, optimal performance
in the Leapfrog task requires planning
from reflective beliefs: updating beliefs
based on past actions and observed pay-
offs while “considering the effect of explo-
ration on reducing uncertainty in its future
beliefs” (Knox et al., 2012, p. 3). In other
words, the Ideal Actor places a posi-
tive value on exploring for exploration’s
sake even if he believes it is the infe-
rior payoff option. This may seem to
run counter to the goal of the task to
choose the superior option as often as
possible; however, the rewards for the
two actions increase over time but prob-
abilistically alternate in their superiority
at an unknown volatility. After a string
of exploitative choices, the actor can-
not know how many times the state has
changed or which option now has the
highest value. Given the non-stationary
nature of the environment, planning is
necessary to succeed in the long run.
Exploratory choices have an informa-
tional value above and beyond exploitative
choices because exploration is the only way
by which an actor can learn about the
underlying state.
The authors also show that the addition
of stochastic choice to the Belief model
(i.e., random choice, sometimes choosing
the exploratory option even when the
actor does not think he should) improves
the Belief model’s performance on cor-
rectly choosing the higher-paying option
to nearly the same levels as the Ideal Actor
(Table 3 in Knox et al., 2012, p. 8). This
simulation begs the follow-up question:
if random choice can look like planning,
then what does it mean to “plan”? It seems
the authors’ emphasis on reflexive vs.
reflective learning, rather than model-free
versus model-based learning, leads to an
inability to distinguish between stochas-
ticity and planning. An analysis of the
value of planning depends on the actor’s
prior beliefs about the environment (the
actor’s model). Indeed, the authors con-
clude that differing levels of exploration
in the Leapfrog task seem best explained
by best-fitting P(flip) rates (Knox et al.,
2012, p. 8) which are likely a conse-
quence of differences in prior beliefs.
Including measures of participants’ sub-
jective beliefs about P(flip) would clarify
whether a pattern of choices is myopi-
cally stochastic or ideally planned. Using
a simple bandit task, Yu and Lagnado
(2012) found that subjective beliefs about
the probabilities of bandit outcomes influ-
ence the structural model that partic-
ipants generate and use to understand
their environment. Knox et al. might find
that exploration levels in their task envi-
ronment likewise depend on participants’
prior beliefs. Given the valuable contribu-
tion that the authors have made by design-
ing a complex task environment con-
strained enough to examine optimality,
expanding upon the Belief and Ideal Actor
models to compare performance based on
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different prior beliefs about the environ-
ment would be a welcome addition to the
literature.
Fruitful extensions of this work might
focus on incorporating the literature
on temporal discounting to build upon
the sequential nature of learning in the
Leapfrog task. Given that the partic-
ipants’ explicit goal in this task was
to maximize the ultimate proportion of
correct choices made and yet behavior
was sub-optimally myopic, how will par-
ticipants’ behavior change if immediate
rewards must compete with distant future
rewards (Loewenstein and Elster, 1992;
Loewenstein et al., 2003)? Such an envi-
ronment, analogous to everyday finan-
cial, education, and health decisions, may
reveal that human decision making is even
more dependent on our prior models than
the myopic beliefs found in the present
study suggest.
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